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Summary
The objective of the Advanced Detection, Isolation, and
Accommodation (ADIA) Program is to improve the overall
demonstrated reliability of digital electronic control systems for
turbine engines. For this purpose, an algorithm developed to
detect, isolate, and accommodate sensor failures was combined
with an existing multivariable control algorithm to give a com-
plete control implementation with sensor analytical redundancy.
The algorithm has been evaluated on a real-time engine simula-
tion and demonstrated on a full-scale F 100 turbofan engine; this
was done by implementing it in real time on a microprocessor-
based controls computer with state-of-the-art microprocessor
hardware and software. The required computational power for
the real-time implementation was achieved with parallel pro-
cessing. High order language programming reduced the pro-
gramming and maintenance costs of the implementation
software.
This paper describes the real'time microprocessor imple-
mentation of the algorithm. Overviews of the multivariable
control and ADIA algorithms are given. The test equipment
used for evaluating and demonstrating the algorithm and the
microprocessor hardware and software necessary for implement-
ing it are described. The real-time implementation made possible
the successful completion of the ADIA evaluation and demon-
stration. Conclusions and recommendations for the
implementation strategy in future research programs are made.
Introduction
Over the past 35 yr, hydromechanical implementations of
turbine engine control systems have matured into highly reli-
able units. However, with the trend towards increased engine
complexity in order to meet ever-increasing engine performance
requirements, the engine control has also become increasingly
complex. Because of this trend toward complexity and the
revolution in digital electronics, the control has evolved from
a hydromechanical to a full authority digital electronic control
(FADEC) implementation. These FADEC's must demonstrate
levels of reliability as good or better than their hydromechanical
predecessors.
Thus, in an effort to improve the overall reliability of the
digital electronic control system, various redundancy manage-
ment techniques have been applied to both the total control
system and to individual components. Reference 1 shows that
the engine sensors are the least reliable of the control system
components. In fact, some type of sensor redundancy is required
to achieve adequate control system reliability. One important
type is analytical redundancy, wherein a mathematical model
generates redundant information that can be compared to meas-
ured information to detect failures. Future engine systems with
demanding mission reliability and flight safety requirements
will require redundant information not only in the sensor sub-
system but also in computers and actuator interfaces as well.
Analytically redundant systems such as in the Advanced Detec-
tion, Isolation, and Accommodation (ADIA) Program utilize
the full on-board computational capability to extract redundant
information from dissimilar sensors. These systems not only
will provide maximum system reliability with minimum hard-
ware replication and computer interfaces but also will, in turn,
offer weight and cost savings.
Considerable progress has been made in applying analytical
redundancy to improve the reliability of the turbine engine
control system. Reference 2 surveys these accomplishments
and defines several technology needs. These needs include
(1) the ability to detect small (soft) failures, (2) real-time
implementation of algorithms capable of detecting soft failures,
(3) a comparison of algorithm complexity versus performance,
(4) a full-scale demonstration of a soft-failure detection
capability, and (5) an evaluation of the pseudolinearized
modeling approach. The ADIA program addresses all of these
technology needs.
The ADIA program is organized into four phases: develop-
ment, implementation, evaluation, and demonstration. In the
development phase (refs. 3 and 4) the ADIA algorithm was
designed by using advanced filtering and detection method-
ologies. In the implementation phase (ref. 5) this advanced
algorithm was implemented in microprocessor-based hardware.
A parallel computer architecture (three processors) allowed
the algorithm to execute in a timeframe consistent with stable,
real-time operation. In the evaluation phase (refs. 6 and 7)
the advanced algorithm and its implementation were evaluated
against a real-time hybrid simulation of the F100 engine. The
objectives of this phase were to validate the algorithm's
performance in real time and to establish a data base for the
demonstration phase of the ADIA program. Recently, a full-
scale F100 engine in the NASA Lewis Propulsion Systems
Laboratory (PSL) was used to demonstrate the implemented
algorithm's operation and performance over a substantial
portion of the F100 engine's flight operating envelope
(refs. 8 and 9). This report describes the details
of the algorithm's implementationfor this engine
demonstration.Detailedresultsof theenginedemonstration
aregivenin reference9.
Thisreportbeginswithadescriptionfthetest-bedsystem
usedinevaluatinganddemonstratingtheADIAalgorithm.
Next,theF100multivariablecontrol(MVC)andADIA
algorithmsare described, as are the implementation hardware
and software. Then specific implementation details and opera-
tional procedures for the engine demonstration are given.
Finally, the results of the ADIA program implementation are
summarized, and recommendations are given for future work.
Evaluation and Demonstration Test-Bed
Configuration
Both the simulation evaluation and the engine demonstration
of the ADIA algorithm were carried out on the test-bed con-
figuration shown in figure 1. The test bed consisted of the F100
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Figure 1 .--Test-bed configuration.
engine system or engine system simulation, the controls micro-
computer system containing the MVC and the ADIA algo-
rithms, the sensor failure simulator, and the F100 simplified
engine simulator. Each of these components is described in
the following sections.
FI00 Engine System
The engine system consisted of the F100 turbofan engine,
the actuators, and the sensors. The F100 engine is a high-
performance, low-bypass-ratio, twin-spool turbofan engine.
The engine has seven controlled inputs (four of which were
used for this effort), five engine outputs, and four environmen-
tal variables. These variables are defined in table I. Strictly
speaking, TT25 is an engine output variable; however, since
TT25 is used only as a scheduling variable in the control (like
TT2), it is considered an environmental variable and is not
covered by the ADIA logic.
F100 Engine System Simulation
A real-time hybrid computer simulation of the F 100 engine
(ref. 10) was developed by NASA Lewis to support controls
research programs (see fig. 2). The simulation has both wide-
range steady-state and transient computing capabilities. This
engine simulation was used for the preliminary control evalua-
tion during the F100 multivariable control synthesis (MVCS)
program (ref. 11) and for the algorithm evaluation phase of
the ADIA program. In addition to the engine itself, the hybrid
computers also simulate the engine actuators and sensors. Since
the simulation is essentially the same as that used for the F100
MVCS program, data from that program were compared
directly to data generated during the ADIA evaluation to
validate normal mode control operation.
TABLE I.--ENGINE VARIABLES
Variable I Definition
Controlled engine inputs, Uco m and Um
WF
AJ
CIVV
RCVV
Main combuster fuel flow
Exhaust nozzle area
Compressor inlet variable vanes
Rear compressor variable vanes
Sensed engine outputs, Z m
N1 Fan speed
N2 Compressor speed
PT4 Burner pressure
PT6 Exhaust nozzle pressure
FTIT Fan turbine inlet temperature
Sensed environmental variables, E m
P0 Ambient (static) pressure
PT2 Fan inlet (total) pressure
TT2 Fan inlet temperature
TT25 Compressor inlet temperature
ORIGtNAE PAGE'
BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH
Figure 2.--Real-time hybrid simulation computers.
Controls Microcomputer System
The control, interface, and monitoring (CIM) unit (fig. 3)
was designed and fabricated to provide an effective means of
implementing control algorithms for research in real time using
realistic hardware--that is, microcomputer hardware similar
to that which would be used to build actual engine control
systems. The CIM unit contains the microcomputer that imple-
ments the combined MVC-ADIA algorithm in real time; this
microcomputer will be described in the section Microcomputer
Implementation. The CIM unit also contains hardware and
cabling to provide a flexible interface to and from the engine
or engine simulation being controlled (fig. 4). This interface
consists of cabling, a patching system, signal conditioning,
and connectors. A monitoring system in the CIM unit allows
the signals between the microcomputer and the controlled
engine to be examined. This monitoring system consists of
selection logic to determine which signal is to be examined
and scaling logic to allow the signal to be viewed in either
volts or engineering units. The interface and monitoring functions
of the CIM unit are described in detail in reference 12.
Figure 3.--Control, interface, and monitoring (CIM) unit.
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Figure 4.--Block diagram of CIM unit.
engine
Sensor Failure Simulator
The sensor failure simulator (SFS) provides an efficient
means of modifying engine sensor signals to simulate Sensor
failures. The SFS unit consists of a personal computer driving
discrete analog hardware. The personal computer allows a
menu-driven, top-down approach tO failure scenario creation,
retrieval, editing, and execution. A failure scenario consists
of the sensor channel(s) to be failed, the failure mode(s) for
each channel, and the time at which the failure occurs for each
channel. The SFS can simulate any of four basic sensor failure
modes: scale±factor change, bias, drift, and noise. These failure
modes are implemented in analog electronic hardware that is
controlled by the personal computer. The SFS allows complete
and repeatable control over the failure size and the timing of
failure injection. Details of the SFS are given in reference 13.
F100 Simplified Engine Simulator
The F100 simplified engine simulator is microprocessor-
based and uses hardware and software similar to that used for
the ADIA real-time implementation. During the engine
demonstration the simulator was used to validate changes made
to the controls microcomputer software; that is, all changes
to the MVC or ADIA software were tested with the simplified
engine simulator in order to guarantee the integrity of the
software. The changes were then run with the actual engine.
This procedure allowed checkout of software changes without
compromising the safety of the engine. Another function of
the engine simulator during engine testing was to simulate the
engine actuators so that actuator failures could be detected.
Details of how this was accomplished are in the Safety Proce-
dures section of this report. Details of the simplified engine
simulator design and implementation are described in refer-
ence 14. Figure 5 shows the SFS and the simplified engine
simulator mounted in the PSL control room.
F100 Multivariable Control Algorithm
The control algorithm for this effort was developed during the
F100 multivariable control synthesis (MVCS) program (ref. 15).
In the MVCS program, linear quadratic regulator (LQR) theory
wassuccessfully used to design and implement a practical
multivariable control (MVC) for a state-of-the-art turbofan
engine. The MVC algorithm was designed by using continuous
Simplified engine simulator (SES)
!
!
!
SFS user keyboard : : SES user keyboard
Figure 5.--Sensor failure simulator and simplified engine simulator,
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system design techniques, because it was assumed that the
update interval for the total control would be fast enough that
discrete design techniques would not be necessary. Originally
a high-speed minicomputer implemented the algorithm (ref. 16).
More recently, the algorithm was implemented with a micro-
computer. A simplified block diagram of the algorithm is shown
in figure 6. The control mode is proportional plus integral with
a feed-forward path to provide rapid response. The control
and output variables used in the MVC are those shown in
table I.
Seven modules make up the MVC algorithm: the reference
point schedules (RPSCH), the transition control, the integral
control, the linear quadratic regulator (LQR), the gain control,
the engine protection logic, and the fan turbine inlet
temperature (FTIT) estimator. Each of these modules is
described in the following paragraphs.
The RPSCH use the pilot-input power lever angle PLA along
with the flight conditions (ambient pressure P0, fan inlet pressure
FF2, fan inlet temperature TI'2, and compressor inlet temperature
TI'25) to calculate steady-state values throughout the entire engine
operating range for the control variables Us, the output variables
Z s, and the state variables Ys- In essence, the RPSCH contain
an accurate, steady-state model of the engine.
The transition control operates on the RPSCH outputs to
provide a transient model for the control to follow during
changes in flight conditions or pilot commands. The transition
control rate limits the outputs of the RPSCH to prevent
excessive deviations, which could saturate the LQR.
The LQR provides the proportional action in the MVC
algorithm by means of a set of proportional gains Ce
calculated by the gain control. These gains act through all of
the control variables to reduce deviations in the measured
engine states X from their scheduled values computed by the
transition control X s.
The integral control permits steady-state trimming of the
engine operating point to satisfy performance requirements and
engine limits. Using both integral gains Ct calculated by the
gain control and the limit flags from the engine protection
logic, the integral control eliminates any steady-state errors
in the outputs caused by slight variations between the scheduled
and actual engine parameters.
The gain control calculates gains for the LQR and the integral
control. Because of the nonlinear nature of the engine, a single
set of gains will not result in satisfactory performance at all
engine operating conditions. The gains, therefore, are scheduled
as functions of PT2, T_T2, and transition control compressor
speed N2 s. This allows the gains to reflect shifts in engine
dynamics due to changes in flight conditions and/or engine
power condition.
The engine protection logic limits the control variables to
safe operating ranges throughout the entire engine operating
envelope. In addition, whenever a limit is encountered on one
of the control variables, a flag is set to limit that particular
control's trim integrator in the integral control.
The FTIT estimator compensates for a slow FTIT sensor.
During transient operation an estimated value of FTIT is used
to predict whether or not overtemperature will occur. The
integral control cuts back engine fuel flow, if required, to
prevent the overtemperature. For the ADIA evaluation and
demonstration, the MVC FTIT estimate was replaced by the
ADIA FTIT estimate generated by the accommodation filter.
Additional information on the F100 MVC algorithm and its
original minicomputer implementation can be found in
references 16 and 17.
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Figure 6.--Structure of FI00 multivariable control.
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Limits
Advanced Detection, Isolation, and
Accommodation Algorithm
The ADIA algorithm to detect, isolate, and accommodate
sensor failures in an F100 turbofan engine control system
consists of three elements: (1) hard-failure detection and
isolation logic, (2) soft-failure detection and isolation logic,
and (3) an accommodation filter. Hard failures are defined as
out-of-range or large bias errors that Occur instantaneously
in the sensed values. Soft failures are defined as small bias
errors or drift errors that accumulate relatively slowly with
time. The algorithm incorporates advanced filtering and detection
logic, and is general enough to be applied to different engines
or other types of control systems.
In the normal or unfailed mode of operation, the accom-
modation filter uses the full set of engine measurements to
generate a set of optimal estimates of the measurements. These
estimates Z are used by the control law. If a_sensor failure
occurs, the detection logic notes the failure, and the isolation
logic determines which sensor is faulty. This structural infor-
mation is passed to the accommodation filter, which removes
the faulty measurement from further consideration. The accom-
modation filter, however, continues to generate the full set of
optimal estimates for the control. Thus the control mode does
not have to restructure for any sensor failure.
As shown in figure 7, the ADIA algorithm inputs are the
sensed engine output variables Zm, the engine environmental
variables Era, and the sensed engine input variables Urn. The
outputs of the algorithm, that is, the estimates _(t) of the
measured engine outputs Z,, (t), are inputs to the proportional
part of the control. During normal mode operation, engine
measurements are used by the integral control to ensure accu-
rate steady-state operation. However, when a sensor failure
is accommodated, the engine measurement is replaced with
the corresponding accommodation filter estimate by recon-
figuring the interface switch matrix.
Engine Model
The performance of the accommodation filter and the detection
and isolation iogic are strongly dependent on the model of
the engine. The model used herein has a linear state-space
structure. However, nonlinear engine characteristics are incor-
porated by representing the base points and the matrix elements
within the linear state-space structure as nonlinear functions
of various engine variables as follows:
= F(X - Xb) + G(U - UQ (1)
Z = H(X - Xb) + D(U - Ub) + Zb (2)
Here the subscript b represents the base point, and X is the
4 × 1 model state vector, U the 4 × 1 control vector, and
Z the 5 x 1 output vector. The F, G, H, and D matrices are
the appropriately dimensioned system matrices. The system
matrices and the model base points were determined at 109
operating points throughout the flight envelope. Three variables
are sufficient to completely define a model operating point.
Previous modeling efforts (ref. 3) used altitude, Mach number
(MN), and power lever angle (PLA). However, in this study
PLA, inlet pressure PT2, and inlet temperature TT2 were used.
The latter set of-variables is more appropriate for ensuring
that all significant model dynamics are considered. Once
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Figure 7.--Advanced detection, isolation, and accommodation (ADIA) block diagram.
system matrices are determined at all 109 operating points,
the individual matrix elements are corrected by the engine inlet
conditions Em and scheduled as nonlinear functions of Z.
These functions are given in reference 4.
Accommodation Filter
The accommodation filter incorporates the engine model
along with a Kalman gain update, to generate estimates of the
engine outputs Z and the engine states X as follows:
= F(X - Xb) + G(U m -- Ub) + K'y (3)
= H(IK - X0) + D(U m -- Ub) + Z b (4)
'y = Zm -- Z (5)
where K is the Kalman gain matrix, _, is the residual vector,
and the subscript m indicates the measured values.
Reconfiguration of the accommodation filter after the detec-
tion and isolation of a sensor failure is accomplished by forcing
the appropriate residual element to zero. For example, if a
failure has been isolated in the compressor speed sensor N2,
the reconfiguration is effected by forcing _¢2= 0. This is
equivalent to setting sensed N2 equal to the estimate of N2
generated by the filter.
The accommodation filter was improved by adding integral
action to improve steady-state accuracy of the FTIT estimate
Zs. Limiting the FTIT at high-power operation is an impor-
tant engine control mode. However because the FTIT sensor
is relatively slow, control action is based on the dynamically
faster FTIT estimate. The FTIT limiting control has integral
action; therefore a high degree of steady-state accuracy in the
FTIT estimate is required to ensure satisfactory control. This
accuracy is accomplished by augmenting the filter with the
following additional state and output equations:
b = K6'y (6)
FT'IT = Z5 + b (7)
where K 6 is a gain matrix, b is the temperature bias, and Zs
is the unbiased temperature estimate. The addition of these
dynamics, although improving FTIT estimation accuracy, results
in a larger minimum detectable FTIT drift failure rate. The
resulting filter structure, which includes the FTIT bias state,
is the structure used in the accommodation filter and in all
the hypothesis filters in the soft-failure detection and isolation
logic.
Hard-Failure Detection and Isolation Logic
The hard-failure detection and isolation logic is straight-
forward. The residuals generated by the accommodation filter
are used in the hard-failure detection logic. To detect and isolate
hard failures, the absolute value of each component of the
residual vector is compared to its own threshold. If the residual
absolute value is greater than the threshold, a failure at the
sensor corresponding to the residual element is detected and
isolated. Threshold sizes are initially based on the standard
deviation of the noise on the sensors. These standard deviation
magnitudes are then increased to account for modeling errors
in the accommodation filter. The hard-failure detection threshold
values are twice the magnitude of the adjusted standard devia-
tions, as can be seen in table II.
A failure is accommodated by reconfiguring the accommo-
dation filter and all of the hypothesis filters in the soft-failure
detection and isolation logic.
Soft-Failure Detection and Isolation Logic
The soft-failure detection logic consists of multiple hypothesis-
based testing. Each hypothesis is implemented by using a
Kalman filter. The soft-failure detection and isolation logic
structure, shown in figure 8, consists of six hypothesis filters,
one for normal mode operation and five for the failure modes
(one for each engine output sensor). The structure for each
hypothesis filter is identical to that of the accommodation filter.
However, each hypothesis filter operates with a different set
of measurements. For example, the first hypothesis filter Hi
uses all of the sensed engine outputs except the first, N1. The
second uses all of the sensed outputs except the second, N2,
and so on. Thus, each hypothesis filter generates a unique
residual vector, 3¢i.From this residual each hypothesis filter
generates a statistic or likelihood based on a weighted sum of
squared residuals (WSSR). Assuming Gaussian sensor noise,
each sample of "l(ihas a certain likelihood or probability
Zi = Pi('Yi) = ke-wssg, (8)
where k is a constant and WSSRi = ,,/T_ -17i with I; = diag
(0/2). The a i are the standard deviations defined in table II.
TABLE H.--HARD-FAILURE DETECTION
THRESHOLD MAGNITUDES
Sensor Adjusted Detection
standard threshold
deviation, o i
Speed, rpm
NI (fan) 300
N2 (compressor) 400
Pressure, psi
PT4 (burner) 30
PT6 (exhaust 5
nozzle)
Temperature, °R
FTIT (fan 250
turbine inlet)
600
8130
6O
10
5OO
I_1 H0 ! WSSR 0
H4
_ (PT6) I WSSR4
H 5
LR3_.__e,"
LR 4
_LR5
Maximum
LR/
Failure
Isolated
No failure
isolated
t
Zm U m
Figure 8.--Soft:failure detection and isolation logic structure.
These standard deviation values scale the residuals to unitless error was dominant in determining the fixed threshold level;
quantities that can be summed to form a WSSR. The WSSR this threshold, in turn, was clearly too large for desirable
statistic is smoothed to remove gross noise effects by a first- steady-state operation. Consequently, an adaptive threshold
order lag with a time constant of 0.1 sec. When the log of was incorporated to improve steady-state detection and isolation
the ratio of likelihoods LR is taken, then while maintaining the algorithm's robustness to transient model-
ing error. The adaptive threshold is defined as follows:
= log (_/ = WSSR0 - WSSRi (9) _,i _--- )kiSS0kEXP -]- 1) (10)LRi
T_kEX p + _kEXp = Mtran (11) _
If the maximum log likelihood ratio exceeds the threshold, =.
a failure is detected and isolated, and accommodation occurs. This heuristically determined threshold consists of two parts.
Ifa sensor failure has occurred in N1, for example, all of the One part, X,ss the steady-state detection and isolation threshold, =o
hypothesis filters except H1 will be corrupted by the faulty accounts for the steady-state, or low-frequency, modeling
information. Thus each of the corresponding likelihoods will be error. The second part, XEXP, accounts for the transient, or
small except for H1. So the Hi likelihood ratio will be the max- high-frequency modeling error. The adaptive threshold is
imum that will be compared to the threshold to detect the failure, triggered by an internal control system variable Mtran, which
Two steps are involved in accommodation. First, all seven is indicative of transient operation. To minimize false alarms =
of the filters (one accommodation and six hypothesis) are due to modeling during transients, the values of ;kiss, ¢, and
reconfigured to account for the detected failure mode; that is, Mtran were determined experimentally. When the engine
the appropriate residual in each filter is forced to zero. Second, experiences a transient, Mtra n is set to 4.5; otherwise it is 0.
the states and estimates of all seven filters are updated to the The time constant r = 2 sec. The adaptive threshold expansion :_
correct values of the hypothesis filter that corresponds to the logic enabled _,iss to be reduced to 40 percent of its original
failed sensor, value, which resulted in an 80 percent reduction in the detection
and isoiatioti threshold _,_. _
Adaptive Threshold
Since the WSSR statistic is the sum of Gaussian variables --
squared, it has a chi-squared distribution. Initially, the soft- Microcomputer Implementation
failure detection and isolation threshold was determined by
standard statistical analysis of this distribution, thereby setting The ADIA algorithm had been evaluated in nonreal time
the confidence level of false alarms and missed detections, during algorithm development. This a/10wed debugging of the
Next, the threshold was modified to account for modeling algorithm and a preliminary assessment of its capabilities. _-
error. Initial evaluation studies showed that transient modeling However, in order to evaluate the algorithm in detail and to
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demonstrate it with a full-scale engine, implementation in real
time was needed. One objective of the real-time implementation
of the algorithm, then, was to respond to this need. The second
objective was to use a realistic microcomputer, that is, hardware
and software typical of that to be used in next generation
turbofan engine controls.
The MVC-ADIA implementation has several distinct
hardware and software features. The hardware for the controls
computer is based on the Intel (Santa Clara, CA) 8086
processor architecture. Three CPU's operating in parallel
allow the fulI MVC-ADIA algorithm to run in real time. The
software is a combination of a previously developed 8086
implementation of the MVC algorithm (in its entirety) and the
software to implement the ADIA algorithm. The ADIA soft-
ware uses floating-point arithmetic and is coded almost entirely
in the application language, FORTRAN. The FORTRAN
subroutines have been optimized to execute in real time. Only
the reference point schedules and table lookup routines within
the ADIA algorithm remain in assembly language.
Algorithm Software
The ADIA algorithm is implemented by the four major soft-
ware modules shown in figure 9: the engine model matrices
calculation, EMODEL; the hard-failure detection and isolation
logic and accommodation filter, FDIA; the soft-failure
detection and isolation logic, FDISOL; and the filter calcula-
tion, FILTER, used by FDIA and FDISOL. Each of these
modules is discussed in the following paragraphs.
The EMODEL software Calculates the F, F- iG, H, D, and
K matrix elements as well as the U, X, and Z basepoints. The
reason for computing F-1G instead of G is explained in the
section describing FILTER. A block diagram of EMODEL
is shown in figure 10. The inputs to the calculation are the
transition control value of fan speed from the MVC (SNFTR),
sensed fan inlet temperature (TT2SN), and sensed Mach
number (SMNSEN). From these, the routine SNFMAP
calculates a virtual power code PCV. The PCV is an indicator
of the dynamic state of the engine and is equivalent to the PLA
that would be required to cause the steady-state fan speed
SNFTR
TT2SN
SMNSEN
EMODEL
RPSCH
SNFMAP (referenoe point U b
{fan speed map) schedules) Zb
I
Nonscaler Compute _ -IG
matdoes _D
Figure 10.--Engine model calculation, EMODEL.
indicated by SNFTR, given TT2SN and SMNSEN. The PCV
is an input to the reference point schedules (RPSCH), which
are identical to those used in the F100 multivariable control
except that PCV is substituted for PLA. The outputs of RPSCH
are basepoint values for the ADIA filter states X b, engine
outputs Zb, and the controlled engine inputs lib. All three sets
of basepoints are necessary for the accommodation filter and
hypothesis filter calculations. In addition, Z b is used to
compute the matrix elements for the F, F-IG, H, D, and K
matrices. Each of the matrix elements is either a constant or
expressed as a polynomial of the Z basepoints Zb, of no
greater than third order.
Figure 11 shows a block diagram of the FDIA module. The
operation of this module, which contains the sensor heat logic,
the hard-failure detection and isolation logic, and the accom-
modation filters, is described in the following paragraphs. The
sensor heal logic allows sensors that have been declared bad
because of spurious noise, or that have been failed during
engine testing and then healed, to be brought back into consid-
eration in computing the estimates of the engine outputs. The
measured outputs Zm of the engine are delayed so that the
measurements from the previous update interval are used. The
estimated sensor outputs from the last update interval, Z,,,,
are then subtracted from the measurements to get the residuals
GAMCH. For each sensor channel that has been declared
failed at some point in the past (i.e., its corresponding failure
isolation flag ICHAN is set), the residual is compared to a
heal threshold THRH multiplied by the standard deviation of
that signal GSDO (see table IT). If the residual is less than
this product for 10 update intervals, the sensor is declared
healed. The heal threshold is usually set to 10 percent of the
hard-failure detection threshold. A sensor that is declared
healed has its correspondifig failure flag ICHAN reset to zero.
If a channel's failure flag is set, the corresponding residual,
GAM, is set to zero; this guarantees that the channel will not
be considered in the subsequent logic. In the hard-failure
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Figure 11 .--Hard-failure detection and isolation logic and accommodation filter, FDIA.
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detection and isolation logic, the residuals are compared to
the product of the hard-failure detection and isolation threshold
THRDI and the standard deviations GSDO. If the residuals
are greater than this product, a hard failure is declared on the
channel and the hard-failure detection flag DFLAGH is set
along with the corresponding ICHAN. At this point all
information concerning both the hard failures occurring in this
update interval, and the soft failures occurring in the last update
interval (flags ICHAN, ISOLT, and ICNEW to be explained
later) are in the failed channel information.
The ICHAN's are then examined, and for each ICHAN that
is set (i.e., for each channel that has had a failure isolated),
the corresponding column of the K-matrix is set to zero. This
removes that measurement from the accommodation filter
calculation. In addition, if ICItAN 5 is set (i.e., an FTIT failure
has occurred), then the entire sixth row of the K-matrix is set
to zero. This removes the integrator state described earlier.
If no hard failures have occurred in this update interval (i.e.,
DFLAGH = 0) but a soft-failure isolation has occurred (i.e.,
ISOLT -- 1), the states and estimated outputs of the accommo-
dation filter are reinitialized to the states and estimated outputs
of the correct hypothesis filter Xic, Zic, as indicated by the
ICNEW flag from the soft-failure isolation logic. In addition,
the soft-failure isolation initialization flag INITFL is set and
passed to the soft-failure isolation logic, to cause all six of
the hypothesis filters, as well, to be reinitialized to the correct
hypothesis filter. Last, the accommodation filter is calculated
by using the F, F- 1G, H, D, and modified K (KA) matrices
along with the control, output, and state basepoints, Ub, Zb,
and Xb respectively--all of which were computed by
EMODEL. The accommodation filter uses the delayed meas-
urement Z m to calculate the optimal estimates of the engine
outputs Z and the same estimates with sensor dynamics
incorporated Z,,. The unlagged estimates Z and the failure
isolation flags ICHAN are passed to the MVC control so that
the estimates can be used in the LQR and, ifa failure has been
isolated to a given channel, in the integral control.
The next major software module is the filter calculation
FILTER, which calculates the accommodation filter and all
six of the hypothesis filters. Figure 12 shows, in block diagram
form, the filter calculation that corresponds to the filter
equations given in the Accommodation Filter section earlier.
However, the equations are actually computed slightly differ-
ently. Previously, the equations were given as
X = F(X - Xb) + G(Um - Ub) + KV (3)
= H(X - Xb) + D(U m -- Ub ) -1- Zb (4)
_y= z,. - _ (5)
The filter is actually implemented as
= F[(X - Xb) + F-IG(U m - Ub)] + K_' (12)
= H(X - Xb) + D(Um - Uo) + Zb (4)
_, = z,, - _ (5)
An (F-tG)-matrix in place of a G-matrix permits isolation
of the steady-state and dynamic components of the states. (For
further details see ref. 3.) Two "switches" that allow the filter
to be initialized are included in this module; that is, the states
and the estimates can be set to a specified initial condition.
U b Xb
i _I
+
Z le
KGAM
Xb
GAMH
Z b
Z m
Figure 12.--Kalman filter calculation, FILTER.
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Initialization is required at startup and when a soft failure is
isolated, whereupon the states and estimates need to be set
to the correct hypothesis filter. The optimal estimates of the
engine outputs Z are shown (fig. 12) as one of the three outputs
of the filter calculation. These optimal estimates are then
filtered to simulate the sensor dynamics. For the two speeds
and two pressures, N1, N2, PT4, and PT6, the latter filters are
simple first-order lags. For FTIT, the filter is a combin_ati0n
of two first-order lags, one fast and one slow, which emulates
the FTIT thermocouple. The estimates Z,, of the sensor out-
puts are used in the FDIA sensor heal and hard-failure-
detection logics. The last outputs of the filter calculation, the
computed residuals GAMH, are used in the soft-failure
isolation logic.
The soft-failure detection and isolation logic, FDISOL, is
shown in figure 13. As explained earlier, there are six isolation
or hypothesis filters. Each of these has a unique set of states,
estimates, and residuals and a unique K-matrix. The K-matrix
for the hypothesis zero filter is identical to that computed by
EMODEL. However for each of the remaining hypothesis
filters, the column of the K-matrix corresponding to the filter
number is set to zero; that is, for hypothesis filter 1, column
1 is set to zero, for hypothesis filter 2, column 2 is set to zero,
and so forth. These modified K-matrices, KI: through KI,5,
are used in their respective hypothesis filter calculations. If
the initialization flag INITFL is set (i.e., the accommodation
filter has accommodated a new soft failure), then the states
and estimates of each hypothesis filter are Set to the states and
estimates of the correct hypothesis filter. In addition, all the
hypothesis filter outputs (Hloo to HI 5) are reset to zero, and
the soft-failure isolation flag ISOLT and INITFL are reset.
For each hyp6thesis_fiitez:_n which a failure'has been isolated
to a given channel (i.e., that channel's corresponding ICHAN
is set), the measurement for that channel is set to the filter
estimate. Since-the residual on that channel is 3' = Z,, - 7.,
setting Zm to the filter estimate sets the residual
corresponding to a failed channel to zero in each hypothesis
filter; this has the effect of removing that channel from the
hypothesis-generation procedure. The six hypothesis filters are
then calculated by using the FILTER calculation described pre-
viously. The output of interest from the filter is the residual
vector. The six residual vectors GAMtt o to GAMI-I 5 are
used along with the standard deviations GSDO to compute
six WSSR's (as discussed earlier). The WSSR's are smoothed
by using a simple first-order lag with a time constant of
TAUEXP = 0.1 sec. The five smoothed failure-case WSSR's,
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Figure 13.--Soft-failure detection _ndisolation logic, FDISOL.
12
HI 1 to HI 5, are subtracted from the unfailed one, Hloo, to give
the likelihood ratio for each failure case DH_ to DHs, where
DH_ corresponds to the likelihood of an NI failure, DH 2
corresponds to the likelihood of an N2 failure, and so on.
For channels that have not had a previous failure isolated
(their ICHAN's are not set), the maximum likelihood ratio
is found; DHMAX then contains the maximum likelihood
ratio, and IMAX contains the channel number corresponding
to that maximum likelihood ratio. The adaptive soft-failure
isolation threshold THRIA is computed as discussed earlier.
If ISOLT = 0 (i.e., all previous soft failures have been
accommodated), then DHMAX is compared to THRIA, and
if DHMAX is greater, a soft-failure is detected and isolated.
In such a case, ICNEW is set to the channel number of the
failed channel, the corresponding failure isolation flag ICHAN
is set, and the soft-failure isolation flag ISOLT is set. These
three variables along with the state and sensor estimates of
the correct hypothesis are then passed to FDIA to accommodate
the failure.
Controls Microcomputer Hardware and Software Design
Implementing the MVC-ADIA algorithm required integrating
the ADIA algorithm with the existing microcomputer implemen-
tation of the F 100 MVC algorithm. The update interval of the
microprocesso-based MVC implementation was 22 msec. The
F100 engine system dynamics required that the combined
MVC-ADIA algorithm update interval be 40 msec or less.
The microcomputer implementation of the MVC algorithm
had been developed by porting the minicomputer implementa-
tion of the MVC algorithm that was used for the F100 MVC
program to an Intel 8086 microprocessor-based controls micro-
computer. The ADIA algorithm was then merged with this MVC
implementation to give a full microcomputer implementation
of the control algorithm with sensor analytical redundancy.
The controls microcomputer, although still based on the Intel
8086 microprocessor architecture, used multiple processors
operating in parallel to be within the update interval of 40 msec
that was necessary for stable engine operation.
Initially, only the normal-mode accommodation filter and
the hard-failure detection and isolation logic of the ADIA
algorithm were added to the MVC algorithm. For this initial
configuration a second 8086-based CPU, running in parallel,
was added to the CPU that was used solely to implement the
MVC. Data were transferred between the Intel 86/30 single-
board computers through dual-ported memory, and synchroni-
zation between CPU's was achieved through interrupts. The
software for the combined MVC-ADIA algorithm was alloted
so that the ADIA software ran on the second CPU while the
MVC algorithm remained intact on the first CPU. This
straightforward way to partition the algorithm allowed the
parallel-processing mechanism to be evaluated. The soft-failure
detection and isolation logic was to be added to the second
CPU at a later date.
In the original design of the ADIA algorithm, the soft-failure
isolation logic would start only after a soft failure was detected
by the soft-failure detection logic. The soft-failure detection
logic was subsequently added to the second CPU, but because
the soft-failure isolation logic required a significant amount
of processing time, a third CPU was added to implement it
in parallel with the soft-failure detection logic. Data were
transferred and synchronized in the same manner as with the
two-CPU implementation. Recently, the three 8086-based
CPU's were replaced with three 80186-based CPU's. These
are Monolithic Systems (Englewood, CO) MSC 8186 single-
board computers (see fig. 14). The features of these single-
board computers are shown in table III.
The new CPU's are software-compatible with the old CPU's
but are considerably faster. Each of the new CPU's provides
approximately 0.7 million instructions per second (MIPS), so
the three processors combined provide on the order of 2 MIPS.
The three CPU's are contained in an 18-slot Multibus chassis
that also contains a floppy disk controller, a graphics interface,
and both analog and digital input/output boards. (The hardware
Figure 14.--Monolithic Systems 8186 single board computer.
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TABLE III,--MSC 8186 FEATURES
[Hardwareand software compatible with Intel iSBC 86/30,]
(a) General features
Dynamic RAM, dual-ported, 150 nsec
zero-wait-state, kB ...................................................... 128
EPROM, kB ............................................................... 256
Programmable timers/counters ............................................ 5
Levels of vectored interrupt control .................................... 13
Compatible serial interface ......................................... RS-232
Compatible bus interface ............................ Multibus (IEEE 796)
(b) Individual processor features
Registers, 16-bit, number
General purpose
Segment
Status and control
Register stack, 80-bit,
number
Arithmetic
Processing time, #sec
Addition
Multiplication
Division
8-MHz 80186
microprocessor_
Signed, fixed
point
1.25
4.5
7.6
8-MHz 8087 numerics
coprocessorb
8
Signed, floating
point
15.6
21
28.7
alias integrated peripherals including three timers, two DMA controllers, and a programmable
interrupt controller.
bcompatible with IEEE floating point standard 754.
configuration is shown in fig. 15.) The disk controller allows
programs to be loaded from disk into each CPU's memory and
permits research data to be saved to disk. The graphics interface
allows research data to be displayed on a graphics terminal.
The analog input/output boards provide an interface to the
engine or engine simulation. The digital input/output boards
not only provide an interface to switches on the CIM unit front
panel but also allow discrete controller inputs and outputs.
The relative timing for the three CPU's is shown in fig-
ure 16. The arrows in the figure represent interrupts. The first
event to occur is a timer interrupt to CPU 1; this indicates
the beginning of an update interval. The first CPU then samples
all the algorithm inputs through the analog-to-digital (A/D)
converters and all the mode switches through the digital input
boards. The measurements required for the ADIA part of the
algori_m on CPU's 2 and 3 are then converted by CPU 1
to floating-point numbers and transferred to CPU 2. An
interrupt is sent from CPU 1 to CPU 2 to indicate that the
algorithm inputs are now available. Next, CPU 1 computes
the parts of the MVC algorithm that are not dependent on the
outputs of the ADIA algorithm--the reference point schedules,
the transition control, and the gain control. Concurrently,
CPU 2 uses the algorithm inputs to compute the engine model
matrices an d basepoints and the Kalman gain matrix. This
information is passed to CPU 3 for use in the soft-failure
isolation logic. Then CPU 2 sends an interrupt to CPU 3 to
indicate the information is available. The soft-failure isolation
logic computes throughout the remainder of the current update
interval and into the next. Any soft-isolation information that
results is transferred from CPU 3 to CPU 2, which performs
the hard-failure detection and accommodation filter computa-
tions, using the isolation information if needed. An interrupt
is sent from CPU 2 to CPU 1 indicating the ADIA calculations
are complete. Next, CPU 1 reads the resulting ADIA outputs
(i.e., information about any sensors that have failed and the
computed estimates of the engine outputs) from CPU 2 and
then finishes the MVC calculations. The controlled variables
are sent to the engine actuators through the digital-to-analog
(D/A) converters. In the last step, CPU 2 calculates altitude
and Mach number from the engine environmental variables,
for use during the next update interval.
Data Acquisition Software
The microcontroller interactive data system (MINDS) is used
for data acquisition (ref. 18). This software runs on CPU 1
during the time when the CPU is not executing the MVC
algorithm (fig. 16). The MINDS package has both steady-state
and transient data-taking capabilities and can access any variable
in the MVC or ADIA algorithms. Variables are defined by name,
memory location, and for integer variables, their scale factors.
1!
Figure 15.--Hardware implementation of ADIA.
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Figure 16.--Advanced detection, isolation, and accommodation timing for
8-MHz MSC 8186. Arrows represent interrupts.
Large amounts of steady-state data can be obtained by group-
ing the variable names into tables and requesting a printout
of a given table. All the variables within a table are sampled
and printed on the CIM unit user console. Transient data are
collected by defining tables of variables to be sampled over
time. The variable definitions, as well as the steady-state and
transient table definitions, are saved to disk so that they may
be recalled each time MINDS is run. The transient data
sampling interval and the total sampling time are defined at
run time. The steady-state and/or transient data taken can be
uplinked to a mainframe computer for off-line processing. In
addition, the software has been enhanced to allow plotting of
transient data on-line, immediately following a transient data
sample, while the controls microcomputer continues to
operate. The on-line transient data display of internal MVC
and ADIA variables was an indispensable tool in the algorithm
evaluation process and in resolving operational difficulties
during the engine test.
Implementation Languages
As previously discussed, different parts of the combined
MVC-ADIA algorithm are divided among three CPU's. The
MVC is implemented in fixed-point assembly language on
CPU 1. When the MVC was originally implemented on a
microcomputer (3 yr prior to the ADIA implementation),
assembly language programming with fixed-point arithmetic
was necessary to achieve real-time execution of the algorithm.
With the development of efficient floating-point coprocessing
hardware--in this case the Intel 8087--came the capability of
implementing real-time controls in floating-point arithmetic.
The advantages of programming in floating-point arithmetic
and an application language such as FORTRAN, rather than
in fixed-point assembly language as was used for the MVC,
include increased software reliability and reduced software
development and maintenance costs. Thus, most of the ADIA
algorithm running on CPU's 2 and 3 is programmed in floating-
point arithmetic and FORTRAN.
The primary disadvantage to using an application language
is that it generally produces a less efficient object code than
the equivalent functions programmed in assembly language.
Execution efficiency is critical for real-time control systems
such as the MVC-ADIA. Programmed entirely in FORTRAN
and as originally coded, the ADIA algorithm took more than
an order of magnitude longer than the maximum 40-msec
update interval. To hasten execution, table lookup routines,
which are written to take advantage of the 8087 architecture
(ref. 19) and are executed frequently in the ADIA algorithm,
were implemented in assembly language, as were the hardware
interface routines, which have no FORTRAN equivalent. The
EMODEL schedules for computing the filter basepoints are
functionally identical to the reference point schedules in the
MVC, thus using the MVC assembly language schedules saves
additional computing time. So that the remainder of the
algorithm could remain in FORTRAN, the source code was
optimized to make it run more efficiently (ref. 20). As shown
in figure 16, the entire MVC-ADIA algorithm now executes
in less than the maximum 40 msec.
Memory Requirements
The memory requirements for each of the three CPU's are
shown in figure 17. Each CPU has, in addition to its share of
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Figure 17.--Memory requirements o1 MVC-ADIA.
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the MVC-ADIA algorithm, an executive routine that maintains
correct real-time operation of the total algorithm. The amounts
of memory required for the algorithm and for the executive
routine are shown for each CPU. Also the memory require-
merits for MINDS on CPU 1 and for the safety software (which
is described in a later section of this report and which runs
only on CPU 1) are shown. In all cases the code and the con-
stants occupy about 75 percent, and the data and the Variables
about 25 percent, of the total memory required. Figure 17 also
shows the total number of kilobytes (kB) of memory required
for all three CPU's combined for each of the following: the
executive routines (16.9 kB), the total algorithm (54 kB),
MINDS (34.4 kB),and the safety software (2.5 kB). A state-
of-the-art 32-bit microprocessor is probably capable of real-
time execution of the MVC and ADIA algorithms on a single
CPU. If so, figure 17 shows what the total memory requirement
would be for such an MVC-ADIA implementation. Combining
the algorithms would eliminate some redundant code in the
executive routines and in that part of the algorithm which was
replicated because of being distributed across multiple CPU's.
About 5 kB of executive and 15 kB of algorithm are replicated
in the multiple CPU implementation; thus a single CPU imple-
mentation would take about 20 kB less memory.
Software Run-Time Environment
The programs for each of the CPU's are downloaded into
memory by using a commercially available disk operating
system, CP/M-86. The operating system allows research data
to be saved to disk and provides t6rminal interfaces to both
the CIM unit user console and graphics display.
Software Development Environment
Software development for the MVC-ADIA code was done
on an Intel Series III Microprocessor Development System.
Each routine was either assembled or compiled on this system.
The software for each of the CPU's was linked and located
in order to generate the executable object modules. The
executable modules were transferred to the CIM unit by
converting them to ASCII files and copying them to a CP/M-86
formatted file on a floppy disk. This floppy disk was then
transferred to the CIM unit.
On the CIM unit, a CP/M-86 executable file was generated
from the Intel executable object modules for each of the three
CPU's by using the CP/M-86 utility GENCMD. The routines
for CPU's 2 and 3 were then loaded from disk into RAM on
boards 2 and 3 by using the operating system. Lastly, the
software for CPU I was loaded from disk and executed. The
result was the multiprocessor operation described earlier in
this report.
In order to ensure software version control, any changes
to be made to the software were first documented in the
software listings, and then the module to be changed was
identified. As each change was made, a record of it was kept
in a software configuration control document. Finally, a new
version number for each of the individual modules changed
was incorporated into a new master version list. The software
configuration control document, the master version list, and
a narrative of the changes were given to the test conductor
for incorporation into the engine-test permanent records.
Engine Demonstration-Specific Hardware
and Software
This section summarizes the CIM unit safety and operational
procedures devised for the ADIA engine demonstration in the
PSL. A primary concern of the research staff was the safety
of the engine while it was operating under research control
(MVC-ADIA). Any event that could compromise the safety
of the engine had to be detected, and appropriate action taken.
Procedures to safely start the research control and to transition
smoothly and safely from backup or bill-of-material control
(BOM) to research control and back again were defined for
operation of the CIM unit during the engine test. Failure modes
within the CIM unit were identified, and safety procedures
to avoid compromising the safety of the engine were defined.
Operating Procedures
To allow for startup and a smooth transition from backup
control to research control and back again, the controls
microcomputer contains four operational modes: (1) startup,
(2) initialization, (3) run, and (4) abort.
The executive software in the controls microcomputer main°
tains real-time operation of the algorithm software and contains
the logic to switch between these operational modes. Each of
the modes is described herein.
Startup mode.--During a typical run, the CIM unit was
powered up and placed in the startup mode. In this mode, the
full MVC-ADIA algorithm was run with synthesized inputs
generated internally by software. This mode allowed any
obvious faults within the computer to be identified before an
attempt was made to run it with actual sensed values. With
the CIM unit in startup mode, the engine was started, and the
altitude cell was adjusted to obtain the correct values of P0,
PT2, and TT2 for the initial flight point.
Initialization mode.--If no problems were detected in the
startup mode with the engine at flight idle under BOM control,
the CIM unit was put in the initialization mode. In this mode
the control was run using actual sensed information from the
engine. All five integrator outputs within the MVC algorithm
integral control were fixed at zero. The MVC outputs were
compared with the sensed actuator feedbacks. If all of the
outputs were within a specific tolerance of the feedback signal,
the MVC integral control output initial conditions were set
so that the MVC actuator commands were exactly the same
as the corresponding sensed actuator positions; this ensured
a smooth transfer from BOM to research control. If no safety
problems were detected, the control was put into the run mode.
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Figure 18.--Actuator panels and missing-pulse detector.
Run mode.--In the run mode, a permit light on the CIM
unit front panel indicated that actuator panels could be switched
from the BOM control to the research control. These panels,
shown in figure 18, provided the interface between the CIM
unit and the engine actuators and provided the switching
between research and BOM controls. (Additional details on the
panels and research actuation system can be found in ref. 17.)
To transfer to research control, the actuator panel switches
(one for each actuator) were manually engaged, one at a time,
by the panel operator. This caused the actuator commands to
be derived from the MVC-ADIA logic instead of the backup
control. Since the MVC-ADIA actuator commands were set
equal to the actuator feedbacks during the initialization mode,
this transfer of control was very smooth. Once transfer to
research control was complete, the MVC integrators were
released, the CIM unit safety software was engaged, and full
control of the engine was assumed by the MVC-ADIA.
Abort mode.--If the CIM unit safety software (to be
discussed next) detected a problem, the control switched from
the run mode to the abort mode. In the abort mode, the control
software was frozen, thereby causing the PSL safety logic to
command the actuator panels to switch the engine to the backup
control. In addition, freezing the software allowed inspection
of the control inputs, internal variables, and outputs at the
moment of problem detection, in order to help determine the
cause of the abort. An abort could also be initiated by the
engine operator or actuator panel operator and detected by the
CIM unit through a sense line. At shutdown, the panel operator
issued an abort to switch control of the engine to backup, where
it remained throughout the shutdown procedure.
Safety Procedures
The normal PSL safety systems were used to ensure safe
engine operation. These included maximum speed and maximum
temperature protection, chop-to-idle or off logic, and master
fuel shutoff logic. However, certain failures, which compromise
engine safety, can occur during operation of the engine on
research control. When these failures were detected, as a safety
measure, control reverted to the backup until the cause of the
problem could be identified. The following failure modes cause
adverse behavior of the MVC-ADIA control:
(1) Failure on input of sensors, sensor lines, and/or CIM unit
A/D converters
(2) Failure on output of CIM unit D/A converters, output
lines, and/or actuators
(3) Failure of controls microcomputer hardware
(4) Failure of controls microcomputer software
Safety systems were designed to accommodate each of these
failure modes. The failure modes and the action taken to accom-
modate them are summarized in table IV. Once a sensor,
actuator system, or output failure has been detected, the
controls microcomputer is automatically frozen. This causes
a reversion to backup control for any anticipated failure modes
and thus minimizes risk to the engine. Specific safety proce-
dures for sensor system failures, actuator system failure, and
controls computer hardware and software failures are
presented in the following paragraphs.
Sensor and actuator system failures.--For the preliminary
engine runs in which the MVC was run wilhout the ADIA sensor
failure logic, sensor failure checks determined the health of
all the sensors. In addition, actuator failure checks were used
to check the integrity of the CIM unit outputs, output lines,
actuator panels, and actuator hardware. The following para-
graphs describe the sensor and actuator failure checks.
Input failure logic: The purpose of the input failure logic
is to determine the validity of a particular sensor signal. This
is done by using a subset of four possible checks on each signal
that is fed to the control. The first check is a minimum-
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TABLEIV.-CIMUNITSAFETYS STEMS
Failurecomponent Detectionmethod Actiontaken
Sensorsystems
Engines nsors(withoutADIA)
Engines nsors(withADIA)
Environmentalsensors
A/Dconverters
Cabling
Sensorchecksoftware
ADIAalgorithmSensorchecksoftwareSensorchecksoftware
Sensorchecksoftware
Reverts to backup
ADIA failure accommodation
Reverts to backup
Reverts to backup
Reverts to backup
CIM unit controls computer
Reverts to backupHardware
Software
Abort logic (watchdog
timer on each CPU)
Abort logic
Output rate checks
Overflow checks
Reverts to backup
Reverts to backup
Reverts to backup
Research actuation system
Research actuators
Actuator feedback sensors
D/A converters
Cabling
Simulate actuators on
simplified engine simulator
Error check on difference
between simulated and
actual actuator feedbacks
Reverts to backup
Reverts to backup
maximum check:
Stain < S_ < Smax
where S,, is the current value of a sensed signal, Smin is the
minimum value of a sensed signal, and S_ is the maximum
value of a sensed signal. This check allows the detection of
a gross, hard, out-of-range failure that would be erroneous
anywhere within the engine's flight envelope.
The second check is a rate check:
ISn-Sn_tt <e
where s,_ 1 is the value of the sensed signal for the last
update interval and e is the error tolerance within which the
difference must lie.
...... "-_yco-@5_i'_n_'tfie_pre_ent atid_a-st Values of the Signal, an
erratically responding sensor can be detected, and a hard
failure anticipated.
The third check is a percent-of-point deviation checki
S (N-percent S) _< S_ _< S + (N-percent S)
where S± (N-percent S) is the nominal sensor value plus or
minus a given percentage. This third check is basically a
minimum-maximum check with the error bounds defined as
being plus or minus a given percentage of the original sensed
value. This check is effective only on variables that are not
expected to change at a given flight condition. However, since
the error bounds are considerably narrower than for the
minimum-maximum check, a hard-failure or slow-drift condi-
tion can be detected much more quickly.
The fourth check is a reference-point deviation check:
IS_-S_,f,_-_l <--e
where Sref, n_ 1 is the modeled value of the sensor from the
previous update interval. This check uses the control's reference
point schedules and transition control to produce steady-state
and transient signal models that can be compared with the actual
sensed value. This error check detects not only hard failures
and failures caused by erratically responding sensors but also
drift or sensors whose dynamic responses maybe incorrect.
The actuator failure check is based on the difference between
a sensed actuator feedback value A and a simulated one A_
as follows:
IA-AEs I--<e
The modeled values are computed in the F100 simplified
engine simulator from simulations of the fuel flow, exhaust
nozzle, RCVV, and CIVV actuators. This check allows detec-
tion of errors in the forward loop, such as D/A converter
failures, transmission line failures, actuator panel failures, and
actuator hardware failures, before they are detected indirectly
through a sensor and do inadvertent damage to the engine.
Discussion of sensor and actuator failure checks: Table V
shows all of the sensed signals, including actuator feedbacks,
grouped according to the types of failure checks applicable
to each, along with their corresponding error tolerances and
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SeBsor
PT2
TT2
P0
N1
N2
PT6
PT4
WF
FTIT
TT25
PLA
RCVV
CIVV
AJ
TABLE V.-SENSOR AND ACTUATOR FAILURE CHECKS
[Values are percentage of full scale.]
Minimum-maximum
Minimum Maximum
1.30 75.00
-2.60 43.00
.25 70.00
20.00 77.00
57.00 93.00
1.00 65.00
3.30 67.00
.60 82.00
17.00 60.00
4.50 55.00
6.60 66.60
0 100
0 100
0 100
Delta Percent-
of-point
deviation
..... ±20.00 .....
..... +2.00 .....
..... +20.00 .....
............. 6.00
............. 5.30
............. 15.00
............. 8.20
............. 9.00
8.30 .............
12.00 .............
14.60 .............
Reference-point
deviation
Steady Transient
state
13.30
7.30
25.00
14.60
21.00
Actuator model
Steady Transient
state
9.00 12.00
18.00 27.00
24.00 36.00
4.20 9.80
limit values. Note that a minimum-maximum failure check is
performed on each signal to provide an initial failure screen
for a hard failure. In addition, group-specific checks are made
to provide additional coverage.
The percent-of-point deviation checks are made on the test
cell conditions (i.e., PT2, TT2, and P0) since they will vary
only a small percentage at any given flight condition. Clearly,
if this type of system were being used in a flight environment,
independent checks of this type (i.e., very tight minimum-
maximum limits) could be made by using Mach number and alti-
tude information from the airplane's central air-data computer.
The reference-point deviation checks are performed on N1,
N2, PT6, WF, and PT4. These signals are all modeled by the
control's reference-point schedules and transition logic to
provide open-loop trajectories for the LQR. Therefore, in
essence, the magnitude of LQR state deviations is being
examined at all times to determine if a sensor failure exists.
The rate checks are used to anticipate failure of sensors
whose signals have no modeled values and no attributes that
would allow limitation of their valid range. Failure of any one
of these signals may be catastrophic. In the event of a PLA
failure, the engine would be unable to hold a reference point.
Failure of FTIT could result in an overtemperature, especially
if the engine was run at military power. A TT25failure could
result in an engine stall due to compressor geometry mis-
scheduling. However, since both FTIT and TT25 are thermo-
couples, they would most likely fail in a hard-failure mode,
which is easy to detect.
The actuator model checks are performed on the WF, AJ,
CIVV, and RCVV feedback signals.
For all of the failure checks discussed, a signal must fail
four consecutive times to be declared bad. Each signal has
10-Hz analog filters to provide extra protection against spurious
noise that might inadvertently abort the control.
The error tolerance and limit values for all of the failure
checks that are summarized in table V were obtained from
the MVCS engine tests. They were originally derived from
the MVCS hybrid simulation evaluation results. The reference-
point deviation checks and the actuator model checks have two
sets of error tolerances: one for steady state and one for
transient. This is desirable since most of the test time is spent
at steady state, and the dynamic models are not as good as
the ones for steady state. Thus, to provide rapid detection of
most failures, tight error tolerances are used in steady state.
These error tolerances are increased during a transient to prevent
detection of false failures.
For the later runs of the engine, the ADIA logic was engaged
and the sensor failure checks on N1, N2, PT4, PT6, and FTIT
were performed entirely with the ADIA algorithm. As a result,
the sensor failure checks from the MVCS program were no
longer needed for these channels; however, all other sensor
and actuator failure checks remained in effect.
Controls computer hardware failures.--The controls
microcomputer in the CIM unit contains three CPU's. Since
all three are used for computation of the MVC-ADIA
algorithm, a hardware failure of any one of these CPU's would
adversely affect operation of the research control. For this
reason, monitoring the health of each of the CPU's is desirable.
Each CPU generates a signal indicating that it is operating
correctly. These signals are sent from the CIM unit as modified
square waves or pulse trains so that a simple monostable circuit
in the PSL safety systems can detect if the signal is absent.
An abort logic circuit, or missing-pulse detector (fig. 18) was
designed, built, and placed in the PSL control room for this
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purpose. Thus a hardware failure or power loss on any one
of the CPU's can be detected. This information is OR'd with
the engine operator's abort signal and passed to the permit
input on the actuator panels; this procedure allows reversion
to backup to be initiated by either a CIM unit failure or by
the operator. In addition, the OR'd output of the abort logic
is monitored by the CIM unit so that the MVC-ADIA is frozen
by any abort situation.
Controls computer software faUures.--The system just
described will also detect gross errors in the MVC-ADIA
software if those errors cause one or more of the CPU's to
stop generating their health signal. However, if the CPU's
continue to function, checks are needed to ensure that the CIM
unit is computing the MVC-ADIA algorithm correctly and
is producing correct outputs. The controls computer software
screens for software execution errors, including integer and
floating-point overflows and divide by zero. Any of these
execution errors will cause reversion to backup control. The
computer software also does output checks to prevent erratic
control outputs from being sent to the actuators.
Output processing and failure checking scales the control
outputs to make them compatible with the inputs to the research
actuators, and it performs the following check on WF, AJ,
CIVV and RCVV:
[ O.-On-1 ] _<e
where O, is the current value of control output; On_ 1 is the
past value of control output; and e is the error tolerance within
which the difference must lie.
This check allows one last test of the control's health by
ascertaining that the outputs are not behaving erratically. Erratic
behavior could be caused by an undetected overflow in an arith-
metic or shift operation or, possibly, by an actual hard failure
of the computer arithmetic unit. The error tolerances for the out-
put check were derived by analyzing data from the algorithm
evaluation on the hybrid simulation. The fuel flow and nozzle
area control outputs may fail this check only once to be con-
sidered a failure. A failure at this point would indicate a pos-
sible catastrophic computer problem, so reverting to backup
control should be done as quickly as possible. Because of the
control's filtering action, noise on the input sensors should
not cause noise on the fuel flow and nozzle area control outputs.
However, for the RCVV and CIVV outputs, noise is a problem
owing to the pass-through nature of the schedules for these
outputs. For instance, the noise on the inputs to the RCVV
schedule (TT25 and N2) could cause noise on the RCVV con-
trol output. Thus the RCVV and CIVV control outputs must
fail this test three times in order to be considered a failure.
Engine Test Facility Signal Interface
When the algorithm was evaluated with the F100 hybrid
simulation, all inputs to and outputs from the CIM unit were
represented by linear, + 10-V signals. The inputs were read
in by A/D converters within the controls microcomputer;
likewise all outputs, including the CPU health signals discussed
previously, were generated by the D/A converters within the
controls microcomputer. For the engine demonstration,
however, the real characteristics of the measurement devices
and actuators had to be accounted for in the controls micro-
computer. These devices included thermocouples, pressure
transducers, slide-wire transducers, electro-hydraulic actuators,
and the like. Interface electronics to minimize the impact of
these varied devices on the CIM unit controls microcomputer
were provided by the PSL operations personnel. However,
software that would accommodate nonlinearities and scale
factors different from those used with the hybrid simulation
was required.
Results and Discussion
The real-time microcomputer implementation of the
combined MVC-ADIA algorithm performed extremely well.
Research results Of the evaluation and demonstration of the
ADIA algorithm with a real-time hybrid simulation and with
an actual F100 engine are given in references 7 to 9. These
results, which include steady-state and transient data for the
FI00 MVC combined with the ADIA algorithm for the
no-failure case and for a variety of failure scenarios, show
excellent algorithm performance.
Several features of particular interest demonstrate the
feasibility of implementing the ADIA algorithm in a production
engine control.
First, the algorithm is programmed almost entirely in a high
order language (HOL). All previous research control applica-
tions and most current engine controls are programmed in
assembly language in order to attain real-time operation.
The commonly held belief that assembly language program-
ming (although it is deemed necessary in some real-time
applications) is less reliable than HOL programming seemed
to be supported during the simulation evaluation and engine
demonstration of the ADIA algorithm. During this 3-yr perio d,
the software Was updated a number of times because of its
evolution from the initial evaluation version to the final demon-
stration version. Even with this extensive software experience
base, several latent faults in the software emerged during the
PSL demonstration. Note that the MVC code on CPU 1 was
the most mature part of the ADIA code, having been developed
almost 2 yr prior to the ADIA implementation. In addition, it
was a direct translation from the code used for the MVCS engine
demonstration; yet all of the software faults were in the
assembly language programs in the MVC running on CPU 1.
Furthermorel all were in sections of the code that were manipu-
lating scaled integer numbers. Using a HOL, then, should be
accompanied by the use of floating-point arithmetic. This
is accommodated in hardware with most state-of-the-art
microprocessors.
Several comments are also in order about using parallel
processing in the implementation of the ADIA. When this
z
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decisionwasbeingmade,two factors were considered impor-
tant: first, using off-the-shelf microprocessors to realistically
emulate next generation engine control computers, and second,
maintaining the original structure of the ADIA algorithm so
as to minimize the impact on the ADIA algorithm software.
(As mentioned in the implementation languages section, the
ADIA algorithm required considerable code optimization in
order to be implemented in real time. However, the structure
of the algorithm remained identical to the original version
delivered to NASA Lewis at the end of algorithm development.)
Some alternatives to using parallel processors were considered,
including updating the model matrices every few update intervals
and freezing control outputs while isolating and accommodating
failures. However, parallel processing allowed the algorithm
to be used as originally formulated and to be fully updated
each control update interval.
An additional benefit, and a direct result of the increased
computing power provided by adding a third parallel processor,
was continuous execution of the soft-failure isolation logic;
this eliminated the need for the original soft-failure detection
logic. That is, soft-failure detection and isolation were both
performed by the same logic, thereby actually simplifying the
ADIA algorithm. Finally, the way the algorithm was parti-
tioned onto multiple processors accentuated the simple interface
between the MVC control algorithm and the ADIA sensor
failqre logic, and in turn, showed the generic nature of the
ADIA algorithm.
Concluding Remarks
The use of parallel processing and high order language
programming not only has demonstrated the value of these
technologies for sophisticated control applications but also has
allowed the research implementation of a combined control
and sensor failure algorithm in a cost-effective manner.
Research results of the simulation evaluation and engine
demonstration of the advanced detection, isolation, and accom-
modation (ADIA) algorithm show that the real-time implemen-
tation worked very well. Indeed, with the actual F100 engine
the algorithm performed almost exactly as predicted by the
real-time simulation evaluation. The fact that the ADIA
algorithm performed as predicted, and in a timeframe, memory
size, and with hardware and software that realistically emulates
future engine control systems, leads to the conclusion that it
not only works well but also is practical and feasible for engine
control systems.
As turbofan engine control system complexity continues to
increase to provide improved engine system performance, the
software cost (already a major part of the control system cost)
will dominate total system cost. Consequently, sophisticated
hardware, and more importantly improved software engineering
techniques, will be required. Toward the latter goal, the
assembly language executive routine in the ADIA program
should be replaced with a high-level-language, real-time execu-
tive routine to take advantage of real-time operating systems
and/or real-time constructs found in high-level languages such
as Ada. With respect to hardware, since the speed of computers
has been increasing at a rapid pace (and is expected to continue
to do so), current 32-bit microprocessors, most notably the
Intel 80386, could perform the entire ADIA algorithm on a
single CPU rather than on three CPU's. This single-CPU
implementation would decrease the hardware cost of the ADIA
implementation even further. Clearly, combining advanced
microprocessors with structured software design and implemen-
tation techniques will enable the use of analytical redundancy
in future complex aerospace control systems.
Lewis Research Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Cleveland, Ohio, July 28, 1989
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AppendixmSymbols and Abbreviations
A
AES
A/D
ADIA
AJ
BOM
b
cl
cp
CIM
CIVV
CPU
D
D/A
DFLAGH
DH
DHMAX
E
EMODEL
e
F
FADEC
FDIA
FDISOL
FILTER
FORTRAN
FTIT
F-1G
F100
GAM
GAMCH
GAMH
GENCMD
GSDO
H
HI
HOL
ICHAN
ICNEWsensed value of actuator feedback
simulated value of actuator feedback
analog to digital IMAX
advanced detection, isolation, and
accommodation INITFL
exhaust nozzle area ISOLT
bill-of-material control K
temperature bias K6
integral gain KA
proportional gain KI
control, interface, and monitoring KTHB
L
compressor inlet variable vanes
central processing unit LQR
system feedthrough matrix LR
digital to analog Mtran
hard-failure detection flag
MINDS
likelihood ratio for each failure case
MIPS
maximum likelihood ratio
environmental variables MTRTAU
MVC
engine model matrices calculation
error tolerance MVCS
system matrix N1
N2
full authority digital electronic control
O
hard-failure detection and isolation logic and
accommodation filter P
soft-failure detection and isolation logic PCV
Kalman filter calculation PLA
application-oriented programming language PSL
fan turbine inlet temperature PT2
steady-state gain matrix PT4
turbofan engine PT6
residual vector P0
residual vector used for sensor heal RAM
hypothesis residual vector RCVV
command file generator RPSCH
sensor adjusted standard deviation S
system output matrix, hypothesis filter SFS
hypothesis or smoothed weighted sum of SMNSEN
squared residuals SNFMAP
high order language SNFTR
corresponding failure isolation flag dT
channel number of the most recent failed
channel
channel number with the maximum likeli-
hood ratio
soft-failure isolation initialization flag
soft-failure isolation flag
Kalman gain matrix
FTIT integral gain matrix
modified K-matrix
hypothesis or isolation K-matrix
adaptive threshold bias value
likelihood of residual vector
linear quadratic regulator
likelihood ratio
control system variable indicating transient
operation
microcontroller interactive data system
million instructions per second
Mtran time constant
multivariable control
multivariable control synthesis program
fan speed
compressor speed
value of control output
probability
virtual power code
power level angle
Propulsion Systems Laboratory
fan inlet (total) pressure
burner pressure
exhaust nozzle pressure
ambient (static) pressure
random access memory
rear compressor variable vanes
reference point schedules
nominal value of sensed signal
sensor failure simulator
sensed mach number
virtual power code calculation
transition control value of fan speed
update interval
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TAUEXP
THRDI
THRH
THRI
THRIA
TT2
TT25
TT2SN
U
WF
WSSR
X
Y
Z
"y
X
O
7"
Subscripts:
b
corn
EXP
first-order lag time constant
hard-failure detection and isolation threshold
heal threshold
steady-state soft-failure isolation threshold
adaptive soft-failure isolation threshold
fan inlet temperature
compressor inlet temperature
sensed fan inlet temperature
controlled engine inputs
main combustor fuel flow
weighted sum of squared residuals
engine state vector
control state variables
engine outputs
residual vector
adaptive threshold
diagonal matrix of adjusted standard
deviations
adjusted standard deviation of sensor noise
threshold time constant
base point or steady-state operation
command
transient
I
IO
i
ic
m
max
rain
mod
n
n--1
ref
S
SS
0/00
1
2
3
4
5
Superscripts:
T
isolation
isolation output
ith value of vector
correct isolation hypothesis filter
measured
maximum value
minimum value
modified
current value
past value
modeled value
scheduled
steady-state
normal mode
N1 output
N2 output
PT4 output
PT6 output
FTIT output
estimated
time derivative
transpose
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